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Abstract
Modern distributed communication networks like the Internet and censorship-resistant networks (also a part
of the Internet) are characterized by nodes (users) interconnected with one another via communication links. In
this regard, the security of individual nodes depend not only on their own efforts, but also on the efforts and
underlying connectivity structure of neighboring network nodes. By the term ‘effort’, we imply the amount of
investments made by a user in security mechanisms like antivirus softwares, firewalls, etc., to improve its security.
However, often due to the large magnitude of such networks, it is not always possible for nodes to have complete
effort and connectivity structure information about all their neighbor nodes. Added to this is the fact that in many
applications, the Internet users are selfish and are not willing to co-operate with other users on sharing effort
information. In this paper, we adopt a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to analyze individual user security
in a communication network by accounting for both, the partial information that a network node possess about
its underlying neighborhood connectivity structure, as well as the presence of positive externalities arising from
efforts exerted by neighboring nodes. We investigate the equilibrium behavior of nodes and show 1) the existence of
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of efforts and 2) better connected nodes choose lower efforts to exert but earn
higher utilities with respect to security improvement irrespective of the nature of node degree correlations amongst
the neighboring nodes. Our results provide ways for Internet users to appropriately invest in security mechanisms
under realistic environments of information uncertainty.
Keywords: security, externality, Bayesian Nash Equilibria
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become a fundamental and integral part of our daily lives. Billions of people are
using the Internet for various types of applications that demand different levels of security. For example,
commercial and government organizations run applications that require a high level of security, since
2security breaches would lead to large financial damage and loss of public reputation. Another example of
a high security application in the Internet is maintaining user anonymity through a censorship-resistant
network. On the other hand, an ordinary individual for instance generally uses a computing device for
purposes that do not demand strict security requirements. However, all these applications are running on
a network, that was built under assumptions, some of which are no longer valid for today’s applications,
e.g., that all users on the Internet can be trusted and that the computing devices connected to the Internet
are static objects. Today, the Internet comprises of both good and malicious users. The malicious users
perform illegal activities, are able to aspect many users in a short time period, and at the same time reduce
their chances of being discovered. To overcome security related issues, Internet users invest in security
mechanisms such as anti-virus solutions and firewalls.
It is commonsense information that due to Internet connectivity, the security strength of an Internet
user1 is dependent on the security strength of other users, especially neighboring users. Thus, from an
individual user perspective, two important pieces of information are the amount of security investments of
its neighbors in the network and the knowledge of the underlying connectivity structure of its neighbors,
as they both drive optimal user investments. Unfortunately, due to the large magnitude of the Internet,
its not feasible or practical to have exact information about the security investments and connectivity
structure of all neighboring Internet users. In addition, most Internet users are selfish in nature and would
not be inclined to share investment information with other Internet users. However, users do need to invest
in security/defense mechanisms to protect themselves as much as possible. In this paper, we address the
problem of optimal security investments when an individual user is uncertain about the underlying network
connectivity structure of its neighbors , and accounts for the network externalities2 posed by them when
they invest in security mechanisms.
We consider models related to two general security scenarios as mentioned in [15] when network
externalities are present: 1) where the security strength of an individual user depends upon the sum
security strength of itself and other individual nodes in the network under operation and 2) where the
security strength of an individual user depends on the strength of the strongest node/s in the network.
An example of scenario 1 is a peer-to-peer network where an attacker might want to slow down the
transfer of a given piece of information, whose transfer speed might depend on the aggregate effort of
1An Internet user could be a single individual or an individual organization.
2An externality is a positive(negative) effect caused to a user not directly involved in an economic transaction, by other users involved
in the transaction. For example, an Internet user investing in security mechanisms benefits all the nodes connected to it and thus creates a
positive externality for its neighbors.
3all relevant nodes concerned. An example of scenario 2 is a censorship-resistant network, where a piece
of information will remain available to a public domain as long as atleast one node serving that piece of
information is unharmed. Another example of scenario 2 is the flow of traffic between two backbone nodes
in the Internet. Modeling each path between two backbone nodes as a node, traffic will flow securely
between the backbone as long as there is atleast one node that is unharmed by an attacker, i.e., there
exists atleast one path between the backbone nodes. Likewise, there are other examples of applications
on the Internet that fit scenarios 1 and 2. We emphasize here that there is another practical scenario as
mentioned in [15], viz., one where the security strength of an individual user depends on the strength
of the weakest node. This scenario is mainly an intra-organization scenario, where once a node in an
organization is compromised due to a weak password or a security policy, its easy for an attacker to hack
the whole system. However, the information of neighborhood topology structure within an organization
may be known to the network users in certainty, but in this paper we focus on the case when users have
uncertain information about the neighborhood topology structure of the network in operation.
Our Research Contributions
1) We present a general model for analyzing individual user security in a non co-operative Internet
environment. In this regard, we study security games when 1) Internet users have incomplete
information about the underlying neighboring network connectivity structure and 2) Internet users
account for the positive externalities posed by the investments of neighboring Internet users. Our
model extends work proposed in [5][6] in terms of capturing network information uncertainty. (See
Section III.)
2) We formulate our investment problem as a Bayesian game of incomplete information and show
the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of user investments. The equilibrium results show
that under incomplete neighboring network topology information, better connected users choose
lower efforts to exert and earn higher payoffs, irrespective of the nature of node degree correlations
amongst neighboring nodes. 3. (See Section IV.)
3In a network such as the Internet, there exists a correlation between the node degrees [11]. In this paper we explicitly model the degree
correlations.
4II. RELATED WORK
There have been very few works related to security investments in the Internet. The authors [9][14] in
their works have analyzed self-protection investments in Internet security under the presence of cyber-
insurance, which is a form of a third-party risk transfer. Under the assumption of users having complete
network topology information, the works show 1) cyber-insurance incentivizes users to invest in self-
protection, 2) cyber-insurance entails optimal user investments both in insurance and in self-protection, and
3) co-operation amongst Internet users result in higher user self-protection investments when compared
to the case when users do not co-operate. However, attractive though the concept may seem, cyber-
insurance may not be a market reality due to factors such as inter-dependent security, correlated risks,
and information asymmetry between the insurer and the insured [1][12]. In addition, it is also infeasible
for Internet users to have complete network topology information.
For non cyber-insurance environments, in a recent series of works [7][13], the authors show that Internet
users invest sub-optimally in security under selfish environments when compared to the case when user
co-operation is allowed. They account for externalities but base their results by assuming users having
complete network topology information. However, as we have discussed previously, in a large network such
as the Internet, having complete network topology information is infeasible. In addition, all the mentioned
related works do not model the well-known security games mentioned in [15], that are in general played
by attackers and defenders (non malicious Internet users) when externalities are present in a network.
In this regard, the works in [4][5][6] tackle the problem of optimal security investments and model the
cited security games mentioned in [15] but do not account for any uncertainty of information that a user
has regarding the underlying network topology. In this paper, we advance previous research in security
investments and model both, externalities, as well as users having uncertainty of information regarding
the connectivity structure of neighboring nodes. However, unlike [5][6], we do not model self-insurance,
and only focus on self-protection without any cyber-insurance.
III. MODELING NETWORK SECURITY INVESTMENT GAMES
In this section, we propose a general model for analyzing network security investments using a game-
theoretic approach. First, we model the user interaction network in the Internet. Second, we describe the
utility/payoff function of the Internet users as a function of their strategies/actions, which are nothing but
the security investments of a user. Finally, we explain the information structure of Internet users with
5respect to the underlying connectivity structure of their neighbors, and highlight the game of investments
that results from the information structure.
A. Network Structure
We consider a set N = {1, ......, n} of n Internet users and a connectivity matrix G = (V,E) of
users, where vij = 1 if the utility of user i is affected by the security investment of user j, i being not
equal to j, and 0 otherwise. Let Ni(v) = {j|vij = 1} denote the set of all the one hop neighbors of i,
where v ǫ {0, 1}n×n. We also consider the k-hop neighbors of node i and denote the set by Nki (v). This
set consists of all the nodes that are within k-hops of node i, where k ≥ 1. Inductively, we have the
following relationships between Nki (v) and Ni(v):
N1i (v) = Ni(v). (1)
Nki (v) = N
k−1
i (v) ∪ (∪j ǫNk−1
i
(v)Nj(v)). (2)
We represent the degree of a node i by di, where di equals |Ni(v)|. In this paper, we assume that each user
has perfect knowledge about its own degree but does not have complete information about the degrees of
its neighbors. (More on degree information structure in Section III-C.)
B. User Strategies and Payoffs
In this paper we consider two types of non co-operative security investment games concerning the case
when users have incomplete information on the topology of the network under operation: (1) the users are
selfish and invest to maximize their own utilities, but the security strength of an individual user depends
on the sum of security investments of itself and its neighboring individual nodes and 2) the users are
selfish and invest to maximize their own utilities, but the security strength of the whole network depends
on the security investments of the most robust node/s amongst its neighbors. The latter type of game is
often termed as a ‘best-shot’ game. In both these types of games, each user is a player and its strategy
is the amount of security investment it makes. We assume here that the strategy/action of each user i is
xi and lies in the compact4 set [0, 1]. We also assume that the utility/payoff to each user i is Ui and is a
function of the security investments made by itself and its one hop neighbors. Thus Ui = Ui(xi,−→x Ni(v)),
4In mathematical analysis, a compact set is one which is closed and bounded.
6where −→x Ni(v) is the vector of security investments of the one hop neighbors of user i. From the structure
of user utility functions, we observe that two players having the same degree will have the same utility
function. We also model the concept of a positive externality as it forms an integral part of the analysis in
Section IV. A positive externality to a user from its one hop neighbors results when they invest in security,
thereby improving the individual security strength of the user. We represent the concept mathematically
in the following manner: we say that a payoff function exhibits positive externalities if for each Ui and
for all −→x ≥ −→x ′, Ui(xi,−→x ) ≥ Ui(xi,−→x ′), where −→x and −→x ′ are the vectors of security investments of one
hop neighbors of user i.
In scenarios where the security strength of a user i depends on the sum of investments of itself and
other neighboring users, we mathematically formulate i’s utility/payoff function as follows:
Ui(x1, ......., xdi) = f
(
xi + λ
di∑
j=1
xj
)
− c(xi), (3)
where f(·) is a non-decreasing function, c()˙ is the cost incurred by user i for putting in own effort in
order to make its system more robust, and λ is a scalar quantity which determines the magnitude of the
positive externality experienced by user i due to the security investments made by its one hop neighbors.
The situation when the security strength of a user depends on the investments made by the strongest
neighbor/s can be modeled as a special case of the situation when a user security strength depends on the
sum of the security investments of its neighbors. We first note that from user i’s perspective, the former
situation implies that as long as there is a neighboring node/s that is secure, user i is safe. In Section
I we have already cited censorship resistant networks and Internet backbone networks to be examples
of networks where the former situation might arise leading to a best-shot game. We had also given an
example of how the best-shot scenarios arising in these networks can be modeled as a graph to reflect
the ‘user-neighbor’ concept.
Once we have modeled a best-shot scenario as a graph, we fix the strategy space of individual users
to {0, 1} and make f(0) = 0 and f(y) = 1 for all y ≥ 1. A binary strategy space of {0, 1} implies that
each user decides either to invest or not to invest. If a user or any of its neighbors invest, the former is
safe, else it is not. We observe that the ‘sum of investments’ game gets converted to a best-shot game. In
this case user i’s payoff follows the following equation:
Ui(xi, (
−→x , 0)) = Ui(xi,
−→x ), ∀(xi,
−→x ) ǫ [0, 1]di+1. (4)
7Equation (4) implies that adding a link to a neighbor who invests zero amount in security mechanisms is
equivalent to not having the neighbor.
C. Information Structure
In this paper we assume that each Internet user (player) knows its own degree but does not have perfect
information regarding the degree of its neighbors. It has already been shown by Newman in [11] that
nodes in an Internet like network exhibit degree correlations5 In this regard, we account for the degree
correlations between the neighboring nodes of a user i in our model, i.e., when a user decides on its
strategy, it accounts for the amount of information it has on the degree of its neighbors. Information on
degree correlations is important as it guides a user to making better security investments when compared
to the situation when it has no information about the correlations.
Let the degrees of the neighbors of user i be the vector −→d Ni(v), whose dimension is di. We assume
that user i does not know the vector
−→
d Ni(v) but has information regarding its probability distribution, i.e.,
it knows the value of P (
−→
d Ni(v)|di). We assume that each player in the network under consideration has
symmetrical beliefs about the degree of its neighbors. Thus, arises a family of conditional distributions,
C ≡ {[P (−→d |d)]−→
d ǫNd
}d ǫN, where
−→
d is a vector of degrees of the neighbors of a node and d is the degree
of a given node.
We model the strategic interactions between the players of the network as a Bayesian game of incomplete
information. The type space of the Bayesian game is the user knowledge on the potential degrees of its
neighboring players. The strategy for each player is its security investment conditioned on the knowledge
of the degree of their neighbors, and the payoff function for each player is as defined in Section III-B,
which depends on whether the game is a sum of investments game or a best-shot game. Assuming
that S is the set of possible investments a user could make, the strategy for player i is a mapping
γi : {0, 1, ....., n− 1} → Ω(S), where Ω(S) is the set of distribution functions on S.
We note that for a player, its conditional distributions concerning the neighbors’ degrees can vary
with its own degree. According to our model, players may have different number of neighbors, and the
degrees of the neighbors are correlated with each other. Thus, the dimension of the vector of degrees of
its neighbors may vary from player to player. In order to address correlation amongst vectors of different
dimensions, we adopt the technique of ‘association’ from the domain of statistics [3]. Association is used
5Newman show through empirical studies that technological and Internet networks exhibit negative degree correlation whereas social
networks exhibit positive degree correlation.
8to track the correlation patterns of groups of random variables, given the complicated interdependencies
that might be present between them. A positive association indicates that higher levels of one variable (in
this case a player’s degree) implies higher levels of all other variables (in this case a player’s neighbors’
degrees).
Given a player i with degree di, enumerate the degrees of i’s neighbors as
−→
d Ni(v) = (d1, ........, ddi).
Now consider a function F : {0, 1, ......, n− 1}m → R, where m ≤ di. Let
EP (·|di)[F ] =
∑
−→
d Ni(v)
P (
−→
d Ni(v)|di)F (d1, ......, dm). (5)
In Equation (5) we fix a subset m ≤ di of user i’s neighbors, and then take the expectation of F operating
on their degrees. We say that the family of distributions C exhibits positive association if, for all k′ > k,
and any non-decreasing F : {0, 1, ........., n− 1}k → R, we have
EP (·|k′)[F ] ≥ EP (·|k)[F ], (6)
and C exhibits negative association if
EP (·|k′)[F ] < EP (·|k)[F ], (7)
for all k′ > k, and any non-decreasing F : {0, 1, ........., n− 1}k → R.
IV. GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze thesymmetric Bayesian game of incomplete information played between the
users of the network under operation. In any symmetric game, the player payoffs for playing a particular
strategy depend only on the strategies of other players and not on who is playing the strategies. We
investigate the existence, uniqueness, and monotonicity of our game equilibria. In studying monotonicity
of equilibria, we investigate the changes in the best response investment magnitude of a user when
other users in the network increase/decrease their best response investment amounts. We also investigate
the effect of the increase/decrease in user degrees on the equilibria of the game. We initially give a
mathematical definition of our Bayesian game and follow it up with the analysis of game equilibria.
9A. Game Definition
Consider a player (Internet user) i having degree di in a sum-of-investments game or a best-shot game.
Each player chooses a security investment amount from the set S as its strategy, where S is as defined in
Section III-C. Let dρ−i(−→γ , di) be the probability density over xNi(v) ǫ Sdi induced by the beliefs P (·|di)
held by player i over the degrees of its neighbors, combined with the strategies played via −→γ , the vector
of strategies of other users in the network. Let
EUi(xi,
−→γ , di) =
∫
xNi(v) ǫ S
di
Ui(xi, xNi(v))dρ−i(
−→γ , di), (8)
where EUi(xi, γ, di) is the expected utility/payoff of player i with degree di and investment xi when
other players choose strategy −→γ . The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game is a strategy vector that
maximizes the expected utility of each player in the network [2][10]. In regard to individual user expected
payoff functions, we now define the concepts of degree complementarity and degree substitutability that
will be of importance in the analysis of the monotonicity of game equilibria.
For a given player i, we say that its expected utility function exhibits degree complementarity if
EUi(xi,
−→γ , di)−EUi(x
′
i,
−→γ , di) ≥ EUi(xi,
−→γ , d′i)−EUi(x
′
i,
−→γ , d′i), (9)
where xi > x′i, di > d′i, and −→γ is non-decreasing. Similarly for a given player i, we say that its expected
utility function exhibits degree substitutability if
EUi(xi,
−→γ , di)−EUi(x
′
i,
−→γ , di) ≤ EUi(xi,
−→γ , d′i)−EUi(x
′
i,
−→γ , d′i), (10)
where xi > x′i, di > d′i, and −→γ is non-increasing. We have the following lemma and ensuring the
conditions under which the expected utility of a player exhibits degree complementarity.
Lemma 1. Given the conditions that (1) Ui(xi, (−→x , 0)) = Ui(xi,−→x ), ∀(xi,−→x ) ǫ [0, 1]di+1, for each player
i, (2) the Ui(·)’s for each player i exhibit strategic complements6, and (3) the family of conditional
distributions C is positively associated, then EUi’s for each player i exhibits degree complements.
We omit the proof due to lack of space. We emphasize here that the proof structure also establishes that
given (1) Ui(xi, (−→x , 0)) = Ui(xi,−→x ), ∀(xi,−→x ) ǫ [0, 1]di+1, for each player i, (2) the Ui(·)’s for each player
6Ui(·) is said to exhibit strategic complements [16] if for all di, xi > x′i and −→x ≥ −→x ′ implies Ui(xi,−→x )− Ui(x′i,−→x ) ≥ Ui(xi,−→x ′)−
Ui(x
′
i,
−→x ′). Analogously, Ui(·) is said to exhibit strategic substitutes [16] if for all di, xi > x′i and −→x ≥ −→x ′ implies Ui(xi,−→x )−Ui(x′i,−→x ) ≤
Ui(xi,
−→x ′)− Ui(x
′
i,
−→x ′).
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i exhibit strategic substitutes, and (3) the family of conditional distributions C is negatively associated,
EUi’s for each player i exhibits degree substitutes.
B. Game Equilibria Results
In this section we state the results related to equilibria of our proposed Bayesian game. Given a
symmetric environment; i.e., players participate in a symmetric Bayesian game of security investments,
we prefer to analyze symmetric equilibria7, as asymmetric behavior seems relatively unintuitive, and
difficult to explain in a one-shot interaction [8]. We omit the proofs of the results due to lack of space.
Lemma 2. There exists a symmetric equilibrium in our proposed security investment game. If the expected
utility function of users exhibit degree complementarity, the equilibrium is non-decreasing, whereas for
user utility functions exhibiting degree substitutes, the equilibrium is non-increasing.
Lemma 3. Given the conditions that (1) Ui(xi, (−→x , 0)) = Ui(xi,−→x ), ∀(xi,−→x ) ǫ [0, 1]di+1, for each player
i and (2) degrees of neighboring nodes of users are independent, then strategic substitutes (compliments)
of user utility functions result in every symmetric equilibrium of our proposed Bayesian game being
monotone increasing (decreasing).
Lemma 4. Suppose Ui(xi, (−→x , 0)) = Ui(xi,−→x ), ∀(xi,−→x ) ǫ [0, 1]di+1, for each player i. If C is positively
associated, then in every non-decreasing symmetric equilibrium of our proposed Bayesian game, the
expected utilities of players are non-decreasing in degree. If C is negatively associated, then in every
non-increasing symmetric equilibrium of our proposed Bayesian game, the expected utilities of players
are non-decreasing in degree.
Lemma Comments: From a user (player) perspective, Lemma 2 states that when user expected utilities
exhibit degree complementarity, a monotonic increase in the equilibrium security investments of all other
users results in an increase in the player’s equilibrium investments, for at least one equilibrium. Thus,
the degree complementarity property of user expected utilities prevents free-riding behavior of users for
at least one equilibrium. On the other hand, the degree substitutes property ensures that for at least one
equilibrium, users are not incentivized to increase their security investments when others in the network
7A symmetric equilibrium is one where each player in the game plays the same strategy.
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do not, in turn providing no additional benefit to other network users by investing relatively more. Lemma
3 states the conditions under which all symmetric equilibria are monotone, and gives an insight on the
topology of the network that could result in all symmetric equilibria being monotone. Lemma 4 provides
the relation between network degrees of users and their equilibrium payoffs, and identifies the conditions
under which payoffs increase/decrease with network degree. The relationships state the contexts in which
network connections are advantageous and disadvantageous with respect to equilibrium payoffs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a security investment model for the Internet in which Internet users account
for the positive externality posed to them by other Internet users and make security investments under
situations when they do not have complete information about the underlying connecting topology of its
neighbors. Our model is based on a game-theoretic approach and we showed 1) the existence of symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibria of efforts and 2) better connected nodes choose lower efforts to exert but earn
higher utilities with respect to security improvement irrespective of the nature of node degree correlations
amongst the neighboring nodes. Our results provided ways for Internet users to appropriately invest in
security mechanisms under realistic environments of information uncertainty. Our results also clarified
how the basic strategic features of the game - as manifest in the complements and substitutes property -
combine with different patterns of degree association to shape network behavior and user payoffs. As a
part of future work, we plan to incorporate the network concepts of centrality and clustering in our model
in addition to degree distributions. We also plan to investigate security investments under an asymmetric
environment, i.e., a game environment in which user payoffs depend not only on the strategy of other
users but also on the identity of the users.
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